This is included in the Warren reading that is no longer on the syllabus. It might be of interest to some, as it has a bearing on Marquis' "valuable-future" view.
From "On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion". Mary Anne Warren:
Suppose that our space explorer falls into the hands of an alien culture, whose scientists decide to create a few hundred thousand or more human beings, by breaking his body into its component cells, and using these to create fully developed human beings, with, of course, his genetic code. We may imagine that each of these newly created men will have all of the original man's abilities, skills, knowledge, and so on, and also have an individual self-concept, in short that each of them will be a bona fide (though hardly unique) person. Imagine that the whole project will take only seconds, and that its chances of success are extremely high, and that our explorer knows all of this, and also knows that these people will be treated fairly. I maintain that in such a situation he would have every right to escape if he could, and thus to deprive all of these potential people of their potential lives; for his right to life outweighs all of theirs together, in spite of the fact that they are all genetically human, all innocent, and all have a very high probability of becoming people very soon, if only he refrains from acting.
Indeed, I think he would have a right to escape even if it were not his life which the alien scientists planned to take, but only a year of his freedom, or, indeed, only a day. Nor would he be obligated to stay if he had gotten captured (thus bringing all these people-potentials into existence) because of his own carelessness, or even if he had done so deliberately, knowing the consequences. Regardless of how he got captured, he is not morally obligated to remain in captivity for any period of time for the sake of permitting any number of potential people to come into actuality, so great is the margin by which one actual person's right to liberty outweighs whatever right to life even a hundred thousand potential people have. And it seems reasonable to conclude that the rights of a woman will outweigh by a similar margin whatever right to life a fetus may have by virtue of its potential personhood.
Thus, neither a fetus's resemblance to a person, nor its potential for becoming a person provides any basis whatever for the claim that it has any significant right to life. Consequently, a woman's right to protect her health, happiness, freedom, and even her life,' by terminating an unwanted pregnancy, will always override whatever right to life it may be appropriate to ascribe to a fetus, even a fully developed one. And thus, in the absence of any overwhelming social need for every possible child, the laws which restrict the right to obtain an abortion, or limit the period of pregnancy during which an abortion may be performed, are a wholly unjustified violation of a woman's most basic moral and constitutional rights .
lebenswelt,
ReplyDeleteThanks for posting that! It's too bad we didn't have time to read the Warren article for class--it's another classic on the issue of abortion.
However, I'm not so certain that it bears as directly on Marquis's Valuable-Future view. Marquis does not think his argument relies on the fetus's status as a 'potential person,' in fact, he explicitly denies that he is making that move. Instead, his argument relies on the assumption that a fetus actually has a valuable future, in the same sense that you, or I, or an infant does. It is the harm done in eliminating that future that is supposed to explain the wrongness of killing.
If Warren's thought experiment were aimed at undercutting Marquis's account of why abortion is immoral, then it would seem to me to miss the mark. The human beings the aliens intend to create from the explorer's cells do not exist yet, and so could only potentially be the bearers of valuable futures.
Marquis, I think, can therefore agree with Warren that the explorer does nothing wrong by escaping and thereby depriving a million potential persons of their potential lives. Now suppose, however, that in order to escape the explorer had to break a million jars, each of which contains a separate human embryo the aliens intend to raise to adulthood and treat with dignity and respect.
Marquis would tell him not to do it. Why? Because the embryos actually have valuable futures, while his own individual cells do not. Warran would disagree. Why? Presumably (I haven't reread the article, so I could be wrong here!) because she only thinks its wrong to kill "persons," and because she thinks embryos don't qualify for that status. But Marquis isn't deaf to statements like these; instead, he argues that personhood-based accounts of the wrongness of killing are sorely lacking, on the grounds that they lead to counter-intuitive conclusions.
This is incredibly interesting. The thought experiment hits exactly on why I think abortion should be allowed.
ReplyDeleteAt what point, though, does Warren consider an unborn fetus a person? If she only thinks it's wrong to kill "persons," what constitutes a person? She says the astronaut would have the right to escape even if he were to be captured for only a day. Is she saying a pregnant woman has the right to have an abortion one day before she is due?
Thanks, lebenswelt. And, mighty skunk, you addressed an issue I still have cannot wrap my mind around. You ask what constitutes a person? What constitutes potential for life? Embryos have potential for life with the right amount of care, as do skin cells.
ReplyDeleteClaiming an dead skin cells have a right to life is ridiculous, of course. However an embryo is much closer to that definition of potential for life.
An argument that relies on potential for life can seemingly, to me, fall prey to the same problem as an argument attempting to define a "person." Where is the line drawn at what defines a "person?" Where is the line drawn at what defines "potential for life?"